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The average error measures show how much the forecasts deviate
from the unattainable ideal of no error. More realistic criteria are
necessary to take account of the properties of the variables being fore-
cast and the degree of difficulty they present to the forecaster.
The past record of the series to be predicted contains information
that may have predictive value and should be exploited by the fore-
caster. To make use of it, some mechanical procedure is needed to
extrapolate the past; since no other variables are employed, there is
no place here for a theory of what economic factors determine the
variable being predicted or how they operate. In this sense of being
innocent of economic theory proper, all extrapolations are "naive"
models (as they have been called) including some that are technically
rather sophisticated.
The simplest extrapolative models, which have long been in use for
this purpose, are indeed naive. The first of these (Ni) predicts that the
next period's value of a given variable will equal this period's value;
another (N2) projects forward the last recorded change in a series, thus
replacing the "same level" assumption of the first model with a "same
change" assumption.
Clearly, naive models of this kind should be regarded merely as pro-
viding minimal standards, which may be useful for screening out poor
forecasts but are not sufficient to rate the surviving forecasts as neces-
1 Ni can be said to specify that A+ 1 =A+ u,+ ,whereu is a random error.
Hence the forecast here is =At*(the preliminary estimate of the current value
of the series). N2 specifies that A+ 1=A+ 1A + u+ ,andthe corresponding
forecast is N2 = +•84 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
sarily good. The ideal extrapolation would be the one which takes
best advantage of the historical content of the series for the predictive
purpose, that is, the one that in the long run yields smaller errors
than any other extrapolation. Then, a comparison of a forecast proper
with such an extrapolation would show whether the forecaster's judg-
ment or knowledge of the relevant economic relations gives better re-
suits than those obtained through the optimum use of the predicted
variable's own record.2
To achieve the optimum extrapolation, a sufficiently long and con-
sistent time series record for a given variable and a knowledge of its
structure are necessary. At best, it might be possible to move closer
to that ideal goal by constructing improved extrapolative models with
the aid of trend projections, autoregressive schemes, and other devices.
In one such approach, we use a simple but frequently rather effec-
tive type of extrapolation, which adds the average value of past changes
in the series to the latest level of the series. This model, called N2*,
is a projection of the mean historical change, an extension of model
N2, which projects merely the last recorded change. For series with
pronounced trends which are approximately linear over the periods
covered, model N2* has a considerable advantage.4
Another approach uses an autoregressive model (N3), in which the
present level is taken as a linear function of the preceding levels of
the series, plus a random error.6 This method imposes greater require-
ments on the data than the other, simpler models. The relationships
between present and past values cannot be measured with reasonable
confidence for any single series as short as those used here. Only very
simple relations can be detected within such series. Obtaining large
2 Jacob Mincer developed a method of comparing a forecast with an extrapolation
which in effect decomposes them both into their common elements and their separate
predictive contributions. A paper on the criteria of forecast evaluation by Mincer
and myself, "The Evaluation of Economic Forecasts," will include a description
and illustration of that method.
S Work in this area is continuing. See the reports by Jon Cunnyngham in the Na.
tional Bureau Annual Reports for 1964 and 1965.
4 assumption of N2* is that A+ =A+ M + u+ ,whereM is the aver-
age value of past changes in the given series as available to the forecaster from the
historical record. Hence, the forecast PN2* A + A.
5The general form of NI isAt+i =a+ b1A + b2A_1 + b3A_2 + ...
The forecast uses estimates of a and b's from regressions based on the values of A
as available in the base period t (these are typically preliminary, A1* at least for t).
The value u+ 1is assumed zero.Yardsticks of Predictive Performance 85
numbers of usable observations for the variables concerned is, however,
also very difficult.6
The extrapolative models have been developed in quarterly terms in
order to appraise the chained forecasts with varying spans, to allow for
the timing of the forecasts, and to realize any possible gains from the
additional information conveyed by quarterly data. The annual bench-
mark forecasts were computed by averaging the extrapolations for the
four quarters of a given year. Much has been learned through work in
this area about how extrapolations of different types are related to the
predictive span, quality of the data, variability of the series, etc. These
lessons are pertinent for the appraisal of forecasts proper, inasmuch as
the latter contain elements of extrapolation, and I shall refer to them
repeatedly in this chapter.
Many economic time series, and particularly comprehensive aggre-
gates such as GNP, are highly autocorrelated. This implies high cor-
relations among the lagged terms in the N3 equations. The large
standard errors of all but a very few of the regression coefficients of
these terms reflect the resulting multicollinearity. In quarterly regres-
sions only the two shortest lags appeared significant according to the
t-tests of these coefficients. Even tests of the combined significance of
several additional terms taken together would not give any definite
support for inclusion of earlier terms (longer lags) in the N3 regres-
sion. Nevertheless experiments showed that addition of a few longer
lags does, on the whole, improve the accuracy of the extrapolations.
The R3 ratios for GNP and industrial production presented in the
next section are based on autoregressive equations with five lagged
terms (A6_, i =1,2,.-.5).
This illustrates the basic difficulty of inferring predictive properties
6 Quarterly figures for GNP and components in the period before World War II
are of questionable quality. The use of wartime data raises serious problems that
are familiar. Apart from the quality and consistency of the data, there is the basic
question of the continuity of the process or processes they measure. The issue here
is over what period a sufficiently stable autoregressive structure can be assumed.
l—R2
7 These tests used F-ratios of the general form
—. — 1,...t—k,where
1 —R2,_1,
k <n, to determine the past period A—for which the additional set —a—itO
A6 yields no further increase in R2 (the adjusted multiple determination coefficient
for the autoregressive equation N3). The results nOted in the text were obtained even
on standards regarded conventionally as "loose," such as significance levels of .10
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from statistical estimates obtained from historical data. Regression
statistics, for example, may often do little more than describe some
average relations within the period of fit. Such information is likely
to prove insufficient for developing decision rules to guide the fore-
caster (e.g., rules on how many and which lagged terms to include in
a predictive autoregressive model).
This paper relies mainly on Ni and N2*, the last level and the aver-
age change extrapolations introduced in Table 1. Model N2 gives
inferior results for most of the variables examined. Work with auto-
regressive models such as N3 yields worthwhile information about the
properties of both the time series data and extrapolative predictions,
but it still poses serious problems of principle and application.
ANNUAL FORECASTS VS. EXTRAPOLATIONS
Comparisons of forecasts proper with benchmark forecasts derived
from the extrapolative models were made by calculating the ratios
of the corresponding root mean square errors (Mp/MN). As noted in
the section on bias in Chapter 4, these measures, involve squaring the
individual forecast errors, which results in greater weights being at-
tached to larger than to smaller deviations from the recorded values.8
The ratios bear the subscript of the model used in computing• the
denominator, e.g., R1MP/MN1. Accordingly our four models provide
as many ratios: R1, R2, R2*, and R3.
For annual forecasts of GNP and industrial production, comparisons
with all four models are presented. The root mean square errors of the
extrapolations for the period 1953—63 are as follows:
MN1 MN2 MN2* MNS
GNP (billion dollars) 24.60 19.34 15.31 15.39
Industrial production (1947—49100) 10.58 11.78 9.91 9.61
Table 16 shows that, for the annual forecasts of GNP and industrial
production, the ratios generally are less than unity, indicating that
these predictions pass the extrapolative model tests (i.e., M < MN).
8 That is, M2 = — A)2.More nearly comparable with the other summary
measures of predictive accuracy (the simple arithmetic and absolute averages) is the
square root of the above figure, M1,. Except in the trivial case where all errors are
equal, M is always larger than the mean absolute error El (and the latter is larger
than the mean error E).TABLE 16
•Annual Forecasts of GNP and Industrial Production: Comparisons
with Four Extrapolative Models, 1953-63
ForecastPeriod
Root Mean Square Errors: Root Mean
Ratios of Forecast Square
Error,b to Extrapolation
MP R1 R2 R2* F?3
Line SetaCovered (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross National Product
1. A 1954-63 12.51 .506 .651 .781 .798
'2. B 1953-63 10.69 .435 .553 .699 .695
3. C 1958-63 11.04 .424 .534 .797 .686
4. D 1956-63 11.40 .459 .631 .939 .758
5. E 1953-63 16.71 .679 .864 1.091 1.086
6. F 1953-63 8.84 .359 .457 .578 .574
7. G 1953-63 7.93 .322 .410 .518 .55
8. H 1954-63 12.05 .487 .626 .752 .768
Irzdutrial Production .
9. A 1954-63 5.76 .559 .491 .554 .618
10 C 1958-63 '4.92 .515 .393 .582 .453
11. D 1954-63 5.28 .512 .450 .508 .566
12. E 1954—63 5.78 .561 .493 .556 .620
13. F 1953-63 4.65 .440 .395 .469 .484
14. G 1953-63 4.83 .457 .410 .487 .503
15. H 1954-63 4.68 .454 .399 .450 .502
aTh.table covers the same forecast sets as Table 1. It refers to forecasts of
levels only. For details,. see notes to Table 1.
bThe general formula for the rootmean square error isMp j_i_(P._A)2,
where P and A are forecasts and actual values, respectively, and the summation
is over the periods covered by the forecasts see text and footnote 7), Entries in
this column are in billion dollars for GNP (lines 1-8) and in index points (1947-49
=100)for industrial production (lines 9-15).
CThe. ratios are: R1=MII'7dNl;R2Mp/ttlN2; R2* =Mp/MN2*;and H3 =Mp/M3.
The denominators, MN, are the root mean square errors of four types of extrapola-
tions. Ni refers to the projection of the last, known level, N2 to that of the last
known change, N2* to that of the average historical change, and N3 to that of'the
average relation between the present value of the series and its past values (based
on regressions of A1 on At-,, i =1,2, ..,5).See text for more detail.88 Short-TermEconomic Forecasts
The measures refer to level forecasts, but the corresponding ratios for
change forecasts are similar and the statement applies to them as wel1.
For GNP, the R3 ratios are about equal to R2* in the periods after
1953—54, and considerably lower in the years after i956 or 1958. The
R2 ratios are substantially smaller and R1 still lower. This means that
N3 or N2* provide the most stringent standards and Ni the easiest.
Judging solely from these measures, forecasters in one group would
not have done much worse if they had simply extrapolated the recent
trend in the manner of N2*, and in another case such extrapolation
would have actually done better (lines 4 and 5).
However, it should be recalled that the changes predicted from year
to year by forecasters are generally well correlated with the actual
changes (see Charts 1 and 2 and text in Chapter 3). As will be shown
in the following section (Chart 3 and text), changes derived by extrap-
olations show much lower correlations with the recorded changes.
This advantage of greater efficiency (higher correlations with iSA) is
not necessarily offset by the disadvantage of greater bias that the fore-
casts usually have relative to such extrapolations as N2* and N3. While
these aspects of forecasters' performance are important, they cannot
be revealed by the root mean square errors M, which measure the
over-all accuracy of predictions as affected by both bias and efficiency.
To deal with the two aspects separately, it is necessary to compare
other measures than just the total M figures.
For industrial production, the simplest extrapolations (Ni) would
have done surprisingly well recently. In fact, the R1 ratios here are
throughout higher than R2, about equal to R2* in the period after
1953—54, and only moderately lower than R3 (Table 16, lines 9, 11—15).
lEn the latter part of the period covered, R1 was exceeded only by R2*
(line 10).
Comparisons in terms of index numbers on a common base showed
the mean absolute errors to be, as a rule, somewhat larger for the in-
dustrial production forecasts than for the corresponding GNP fore-
casts (Table 1, lines 9—22, columns 4 and 5). However, the MP/MN
9Theratios are more meaningful for the levels, since the forecasters' base estimates
(ECP) are themselves often derived by, or attributed to, some kind of extrapolation.
Where the errors with respect to the base values are smaller for the forecasts than
for the extrapolations, the level ratios will typically be more favorable to the fore-
casts than the change ratios. This is true for the cases mentioned earlier in which
the ECP errors make the predictions of levels more inaccurate than those of changes.Yardsticks of Prë'djctive Performance 89
ratios in Table 16 tend to be lower for industrial production than for
GNP, when compared for the same sources and extrapolative models.
This would suggest that, relative to these extrapolations, industrial
production was predicted better than GNP. But it is important to
note that this result depends on the particular extrapolative procedures
adopted. To make the measures for the two variables and for the differ-
ent models comparable, the models were computed in all cases on the
assumption that the last value known to the forecaster is that for the
third quarter of the base year. This fits well enough the situation for
GNP, a quarterly series, but industrial production is available monthly
and those who forecast this variable at the end of the year usually
know its preliminary estimate for October and may even know that for
November. When models Ni, N2, and N2* for industrial production
were recomputed, with November as the last known position or base,
very considerable improvements of the extrapolations and correspond-
ing increases in the R ratioswere obtained, compared with the results
shown in Table 16, lines 9—15.'°
The differences between the extrapolations for GNP and industrial
production reflect differences in the behavior of the two series over
time. To take the simplest illustration, it is clear that Nl yields smaller
errors than N2 at turning points. In general, Ni performs better on
the more cyclical and irregular series. N2 performs better only for
smooth series with persistent trends. Industrial production fluctuated
considerably more than GNP; its growth was somewhat weaker and
less steady. This can explain why N2 is better than Ni for the annual
predictions of GNP but worse for industrial production.
Again, it is instructive to compare Ni and N2* in this context.
The main weakness of the former model isthat, in disregarding
change, it produces forecasts with a large bias (underestimation errors
for the growing series). Model N2* corrects largely for this bias, but
it too is worse than Ni on turning points (and also on marked retar-
10Theratios showed the greatest increases, of up to 50 per cent; on the No-
vember base, these ratios fall in the .65 to .80 range and considerably exceed the
corresponding measures for GNP. The increases in ratios were much smaller
and those instill smaller (note that the weight of the base period is smaller in
models N2 and N2* than in NI). Among the recomputed ratios, R1 exceeded the
others, except in the most recent years when the ratios were higher (the R3
ratios were not recomputed; our autoregressive extrapolations all use quarterly data
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dations). As already indicated, the role of the bias is greater for GNP,
and that of the turning-point errors for industrial production.la
PATTERNS OF ERRORS IN FORECASTS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS
Chart 5 shows for benchmark extrapolations what Charts1 and 2
showed for the forecasts proper. It is clear that the results for the
extrapolations are decidedly inferior.
Consider the model N2*, that is, the projections of average histori-
cal change, which turned Out to be relatively effective for GNP in
terms of the over-all average errors (Table 16). Chart 5 shows that
the changes predicted by this model are nearly constant from one year
to the next; they approximate a straight line cutting through the "ac-
tual" GNP changes at the $20 billion level. This, of course, would be
necessarily so for any series with a pronounced and relatively stable
growth rate, and the results for industrial production are indeed very
similar to those for GNP.
In short, the strength of N2* lies in its being a relatively good
trend estimate, thus nearly free of bias. But the weakness of this model
lies in its being poorly correlated with the actual changes (in other
words, in the high residual variance component of its errors). Espe-
cially in periods of large deviations from the trend, as in the recession
years 1954 and 1958, the errors produced by N2* must be and obvi-
ously are large, as shown in Chart 5, for both GNP and industrial pro-
duction.
The autoregressive model N3, which uses lags of one to five quarters,
yields forecasts that, unlike those of N2*, vary a great deal from year
to year. However, the correlation of these forecasts with actual changes
is low for GNP and only moderate (though significant) for industrial
production. The errors of the two models are similar in size. They also
show some correspondence in their year-to-year changes, notably peak
values in the 1953—54 and 1957—58 intervals.
Thus itis easy to see that, in terms of correlation with actual
UFurtherevidence along the same lines is provided by results for other variables.
Consumption is similar to GNP in smoothness and trend, and for both series the
models N2* and N3 rank highest and Ni the lowest. (Five lagged terms are needed
in both cases to make N3 about as good as N2*.) For plant and equipment expendi-
tures, a series with more variability and less trend than the others, N3 turns out
to be the best of the models within the whole range of one to five lagged terms.
Here, as for the production index, Ni ranks higher than N2*, and N2 is the worst.CHART 5
TwoTypes of Extrapolations of Industrial Production and GNP,
Actual and Predicted Changes and Errors, 1953—63
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changes, the annual forecasts of GNP and industrial production are
definitely better than either of the extrapolations N2* and N3. The
coefficients of correlation between actual and predicted changes in the
tabulation below for 1953—63 provide numerical evidence in support
of this statement:
Forecasts Extrapolations
E F G N2* N3
GNP .642 .900 .882 .182 .424
Industrial production .759 .920 .895 .595 .601
The fact that the actual and predicted year-to-year changes in GNP
and industrial production are in general well correlated should not be
interpreted to mean that the changes are effectively forecast a full year
ahead. Our analysis of the multiperiod forecasts shows that forecasters
typically achieve a considerable measure of success in predicting the
next one or two quarters ahead, but limited success beyond that. Let
us also recall that the annual record can likewise be interpreted as im-
plying an effective forecasting range of little more than two quarters.
Not only are the forecasts typically made late in the preceding calendar
year, but patterns of performance very similar to those shown here
could be obtained merely by accurately forecasting the first one or two
quarters of the ensuing year and assuming no change beyond that.
This is indicated by our experiments with ex-post extrapolations sum-
marized later in this chapter (see Table 19 and Chart 5).
SECTORAL FORECASTS, EXTRAPOLATIONS, AND
BUSINESSMEN'S ANTICIPATIONS
The summary measures of relative error show forecasts of consumption
to be better than forecasts of government spending and much better
than those of investment (Table 5, column 1). When taken relative
to the extrapolative benchmark models, however, consumption often
comes out worse than either investment or government expenditures
(Table 17, columns 2 and 3). In fact, the .Ra* ratios in set F exceed
unity only for consumption and residential construction. They are
very high for all three of the major consumption components, which
indicates the marked inferiority of these forecasts to simple trend
extrapolations. Consumption of durables, which is by far the most
variable of these components and which has the largest errors of rela-Yardsticks of Predictive Performance 93
tivechange, shows the lowest R2* ratio of the three. The corresponding
ratios for consumption forecasts B and C are only slightly less than one.
Since consumption has been rising steadily in recent years, the strong
showing of the trend extrapolation produced by the N2* model is not
difficult to understand. This applies particularly to consumption of
nondurables and services. Other GNP components are much less
smooth, hence for them such projections are far less effective.
It is clear that the consumption forecasts fail to make use of much
information in the past behavior of households that could have signifi-
cantly improved the forecasts. Consumption may be able to provide the
greatest scope for improvement of the GNP expenditure forecasts.
Forecasts of construction (especially residential), changes in inven-
tories, and net foreign investment are greatly in need of improvement.
Although these series have relatively weak trends and strong cyclical
and irregular variations, the N2* extrapolations for them are often
nearly as good as the forecasts proper, and sometimes better. This
finding will be recognized as particularly unfavorable to the forecasts,
since the extrapolations must be rather inefficient here (unlike the case
of consumption). The evidence on construction is given in Table 17.
The forecasts of net changes in inventories and net foreign investment,
as can be seen from the tabulation below, tend to be weak and inferior
to the total investment forecasts (the ratios are particularly high for
the A forecasts which, it must be remembered, have considerably
longer spans than the others). Since these variables assume negative
values, the ratios shown are based on absolute change errors.'2
R2* Ratios for Forecast Sets
A B F
Gross private domestic investment 1.360 .883 .618
Net change in inventories 1.457 1.048 .843
Net foreign investment 1.185 1.017 .992
Forecasts of producers' durable equipment are in most cases better
relative to extrapolations than forecasts of consumption, housing, in-
ventory changes, and net foreign investment. The same is true of the
forecasts of total plant and equipment outlays, although the record for
the plant (or nonresidential construction) component tends to be worse
12 The differences between the ratios for absolute and those for percentage errors
tend to be small when both units of measurement are applicable (compare the ratios
for GPDI in the above tabulation and in Table 17).94 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
TABLE 17
Forecastsof RelativeChanges in Major Components of GNP:











Line Predicted Variable (1) (2) (3)
Forecast Set B: 1953-63
1.Gross national product 2.15 .395 .660
2.Personal consumption expenditures 1.52 .318 .911
3.Gross private domestic investment 12.83 .901 1.010
4.Plant and equipment 7.80 .901 1.127
5.Housing. 14.12 1.229 2.028
6.Total government expenditures: 2.82 .406 .457
7.Federal 5.48 .681 .605
8.State and local 2.01 .239 1.214
Forecast Set F: 1953-63
9.Gross national product 1.70 .312 .521
10.Personal consumption expenditures 1.69 .354 1.015
11.Gross private domestic investment 7.20 .506 .567
12.Total government expenditures 2.15 .309 .348
Forecast Set F: Other Periods
13.Consumer durables 5.36 .663 1.250
14.Consumer nondurables 1.56 .444 2.425
15.COnsumer services 1.7.8 .280 1.334
16.Producers' durables .6.05 .495 .603
17.Nonresidential construction 4.01 .719 .904
18.Residential nonfarm construction 9.15 .931 1.596
19.Federal gOvernment expenditures 1.86 .315 .527
20.State and local expenditures 1.35 .160 .741
(continued)Yardsticks of Predictive Performance 95
TABLE 17 (concluded)





Line Predicted Variable (1) (2) (3)
Forecast Set A: 1958-63
21.Gross national product 1.92 .368 1.027
22.Personal consumption expenditures 1.01 .222 .771
23.Consumer durables 5.21 .901 .935
24.Gross private domestic investment 11.43 1.118 1.255
25.Producers' durables 6.36 .562 .593
26.New construction 5.08 .898 1.9 17
27.Total government expenditures .3.15 .410 .861
Forecast Set C: 1958-63
28.Gross national product 2.04 .374 .726
29.Personal consumption expenditures 1.44 .310 .960
30.Gross private domestic investment 8.50 .570 .666
31.Plant and equipment 4.95 .597 .643
32.Residential construction
.9.04 .865 2.251
33.Total government expenditures 2.17 .319 .893
34.Federal 3.56 .593 1.027
35.State and local 1.94 .232 1.019
aEntries on lines 13-15 cover 1959-63; lines 16, 19, and 20, 1955-63;
lines 17 and 18, 1956-63.
Note: This table covers the same, forecast sets as Table 5 and, like the
latter, uses measures based on errors of percentage changes (as defined in
Chapter 4, text and note 5). The extrapolations match the forecasts strictly
(for set A, they refer to the last quarter of the year wherever the forecasts
do, see Table 5, note c; in all other cases, they are annual).
than that for equipment.1 A marked exception, however, is provided
by set B, in which the plant and equipment predictions are decidedly
poor, worse than the trend projections and than the predictions for
all but two GNP components (see Table 17, column 3).
13Comparelines 16 and 17, columns 2 'and 3. of Table 17. It should be noted that
the opposite is true of the absolute errors; see the corresponding measures in col-
umn 1 and also footnote 6 in Chapter 4.96 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
It is possible that these findings reflect the predictive value and
usefulness to forecasters of data on investment anticipations. Most of
the end-of-year forecasts can andçlo use the figures from the McGraw-
Hill Survey of Investment Intentions, which is conducted annually and
released in November. However, company forecast B and also the
group forecasts D and E are made in October, that is, before the release
of this survey. It is particularly interesting here to compare the per-
formance of sets B and F, which are generally similar in over-all qual-
ity. As shown in Table 17, the errors in forecasts of gross private
domestic investment were much larger for set B than for set F (the
M values are 13.4 and 7.5, respectively, see lines 3 and 11, column 1)
and most of this difference can be traced to the plant and equipment
component of investment.' Whereas in forecasting consumption and
the rest of GNP other than fixed investment the errors in set B are
either smaller than, or about the same as in set F, in predicting GNP
as a whole, st F is appreciably better than set B. This is clearly be-
cause of its superiority in the investment sector, which very likely
reflects the fact that set F did, whereas set B did not, utilize the in-
vestment anticipations data.
In this connection, it is also interesting to note that the base-period
estimates (ECP) are often considerably better for business capital out-
lays than for other GNP components. This, too, is probably due in
large measure to the availability of anticipations surveys, including the
quarterly ones made jointly by the Commerce Department's Office of
Business Economics and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(OBE-SEC).
The OBE-SEC annual surveys are conducted in January—February
and published in March; hence, they provide, in effect, shorter-span
predictions thaINtkose made by our forecasters at earlier dates, be-
tween October and January. The predictive record of these survey
data is as good as it is partly because of their relatively short horizon.
Even so, it is significant that they show much higher correlations with
expenditures on producers' durables and nonresidential construction
than the global investment forecasts in our collection do.15 Such corn-
14Comparethe errors of set B in plant and equipment (Table 17, line 4) with
the errors of set F in groducers' durables and nonresidential construction (lines 16
and 17). The differences in favor of set F persist when the errors are recomputed
for 1956—63, the period in which these forecats overlap.
15Theforecast and actual values are for the GNP components representing
private "fixed investment," that is, the sum of the above two categories of expendi-Yardsticks of Predictive Performance 97
parisons, though inevitably crude, provide some additional evidence
of the relative success of anticipations data for fixed investment.'°
FORECASTS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS OVER VARYING SPANS
While average forecast errors nearly always increase with the lengthen-
ing of the predictive span, the R1 ratios show no definite tendency to
rise along with the span (Table 18). This is so because the errors of
base-level extrapolations also grow larger as the period over which the
extrapolations are rpade is lengthened. The same applies to the R2
ratios, which are not shown in the table (they are, in most cases here,
smaller than R1, contrary to the case for the annual GNP forecasts)1T
On the whole, the R1 ratios do not vary greatly for the different
spans. In some cases, particularly for industrial production, they do
increase appreciably when applied to longer forecasts (Table 18, lines
23 or 35). Elsewhere, counterexamples are found, however: a longer
forecast, despite its larger average error, may be better than a shorter
one when judged by comparison with a naive model (lines 8, 11, and
17). The ratios are all less than one, that is, the errors of extrapolations
Nl increase with the span sufficiently to remain on the average larger
than the errors of the forecasts proper.
The R2* and R3 ratios are all considerably larger than either R1 or
R2. When two lagged terms are used in the N3 autoregressions, the re-
sults tend to be inferior to those of the trend projections N2* (i.e.,
R3 <R2* in most cases). But the differences between these ratios are
on the whole small, and inclusion of additional lags should here and
ture. The anticipations data are based on a somewhat different concept which ex-
cludes private nonbusiness institutions, capital outlays charged to current expense,
and some other items. In terms of levels, therefore, forecasts have smaller errors than
anticipations when both are compared with the investment components of GNP;
but this, of course, merely reflects differences in measurement, not in predictive per-
formance. What is meaningful, however, is 'that the anticipations data (Z) show
higher correlations with the recorded fixed investment outlays (I) than the global
forecasts (P) do. Moreover, forecasts hardly add anything to a statistical explanation
of the variance of I after allowing for the high correlation between 1 and Z. The
partial correlation coefficients r1 are in all cases small absolutely and a few are
negative, while the values of are all positive and relatively high.
16Severalrecent writings offer substantial evidence that the expectations or in-
tentions of business management regarding fixed investment have direct and con-
siderable predictive value. See, e.g., the essays in The Quality and Economic Signifi-
cance of Anticipations Data (Princeton for the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1960), particularly those by Dexter M. Keezer, et al.(pp. 369—386), and
Arthur M. Okun (pp. 407—460).
17 Whenshorter time units are used, as in the chained forecasts, the advantage
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Notes to Table 18
aAll measures refer to level forecasts. The forecast setsare the
same as those in Table 9, with two exceptions: (1) for GNP, a subset
of D was added covering the years 1953-63, with sixteen observations
per span (lines 7-9); (2) for industrial production, another subset of
D was added covering the years 1947-63, with thirty-three observations
per span (lines 25-27). For further details, see Table 9.
bThe meaning of the Symbols isas follows:
lvi =\,j )1 (P-A)2 ,whichis the root mean square error of forecast
(in billion dollars for GNP; in index points,
1947-49 =100,for industrial production),
R1 =M/MN1R2 =M/MN2*.Theseare the root mean square
error ratios of forecast to extra-
polation.
CThe entries on this line are not strictly comparable because some
of the forecast chains are "incomplete," so that the. number of obser-
vations for different spans varies. See Table 9, note b,
dBasedon forecasts in constant prices,.as reported, andon corre-
sponding extrdpol ations.
there tip the scales in favor of N3 (the evidence on this point is still
incomplete).
In most cases the R2* ratios show increases when the predictive span
is extended (Table 18). This means that the N2* extrapolations do not
deteriorate as much as the forecasts proper, so that their relative per-
formance improves as spans lengthen. It should be noted that the same
applies to the autoregressive predictions: the R3 ratios also tend to
rise for the longer forecasts. Model N3 does indeed suggest the likeli-
hood of this result.18
18Supposethat A =a+ b A_1 + u. Then+a + b A + u,+a(l + b)
+ b2A5—1+ (bus + Over the span of one period, the variance of the resi-
duals is var (ui); over two periods, it is var (bus + u,+ )which, assuming that the
u's are independent and have equal variances, equals (1 + b2) var (u) Thus the
variance increases with the span, depending on the size of b. This is illustrated here
in the simplest case of a first-order autoregression, but the same argument applies
to more complex situations.
Extrapolations for increasing spans are derived by stepwise "chaining" of pre-
dicted and observed values as follows. Let the forecast for one quarter ahead be
=a+ b1A_1 + b2A_2 -..;for two quarters, A+1 =a+ b1A + b2A_1
etc. The coefficients a, b1, b2...areestimated in the first step (which mayYardsticks of Predictive Performance 103
For two sets of GNP forecasts, the R2* ratios are all larger than one
(lines 3 and 15), indicating that here both the six- and the twelve-
month predictions are on the whole worse than the average change
extrapolations over the periods covered.'9 For other sets, the R2* ratios
are less than one for the short spans, but they approach or exceed
one for the longer spans (mostly nine to fifteen months, in orte case
fifteen to eighteen months; see Table 18, lines 6, 12, and 18).
For industrial production, the ratios grow smaller as the spans
lengthen. Our table includes only three instances of R2* > 0.9 and only
one of R2* > 1.0, all in the range of twelve- to fifteen-month forecasts
(lines 24 and 36).
Presumably, the observed association between longer forecasts and
larger errors can be partly explained by the fact that extrapolations of
various types also tend to worsen as the predictive span lengthens. The
past behavior of the series to be predicted will usually be considered
in some way by the forecaster, and many explicitly use various extrap-
olative techniques. Forecast and extrapolation often have much in
common, and the latter may be viewed as one of the ingredients of the
former.20 However, forecasters apparently fail to use the historical con-
tent, of the series as efficiently as they might even by fairly simple and
inexpensive means, perhaps because they pay too much attention to
the very few values in the most recent past. Better use of trend pro-
jections would have improved many forecasts, particularly those of
GNP over longer spans. This can be inferred from the comparisons of
forecasts with the N2* model. As shown earlier, the growth of the
economy has often been underestimated in the forecasts, an error that
simple trend extrapolations would have helped to reduce.
relate to the fourth quarter of the base year, ECP) and retained in the following
steps for the given multiperiod forecast (say, for the estimation of the four quarters
of the next year).
Some experiments were also made with another approach, consisting of separate
fittings for different spans: regressions of A, A,, ..
.A+on AA—2
(thisgives five equations for each year covered by the predictions). It is interesting
that the two approaches gave very similar results for GNP. In general, however, the
chained forecasts are more accurate than the fits by span.
19 As will be shown later, the results of such comparisons depend on the periods
covered. It should be noted that one of these sets (A) includes the early postwar
years, 1947—49, for which forecasts were particularly poor.
20 Statistical methods, e.g., partial correlation analysis, can help evaluate this re-
lation; work along these lines is in process (see footnote 2 above).104 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
Other ingredients of forecasts may, to be sure, also contribute to
the decreasing accuracy of longer-range predictions. These ingredients
—variables that typically move in advance of the predicted series,
anticipations data, and the forecasters' own judgment—also are prob-
ably decreasingly reliable over longer spans.
NEAR-TERM FORESIGHT AND ACCURACY OF
ANNUAL PREDICTIONS
We find, then, that forecasts of the near future are definitely superior
to all types of extrapolation, while forecasts with longer spans, of nine
or twelve months and more, are not (they are in fact worse than some
extrapolations). Let us also recall that the year-to-year forecasts proved
generally better than extrapolations. Are these findings consistent?
Does the record of the annual forecasts imply greater accuracy than
that of the forecasts with varying spans?
The answers are yes to the first question and no to the second. The
annual forecasts are generally made late in the preceding calendar year.
They can be viewed as averages of the quarterly or semiannual fore-
casts and some are actually so computed; their mean spans, then, are
roughly six months (or again somewhat more than that for the "effec.
tive span"). Errors of the (explicit or implicit) forecasts for parts of
the year could in some degree be mutually offsetting, which would tend
to make the annual forecasts better than most of the shorter ones. This
seems, indeed, to be true in some cases. On the whole, however, annual
forecasts definitely tend to be better only relative to the forecasts for
the late parts of the year, not to those for the early parts.
Furthermore, a good predictive record for the first two quarters
would be sufficient to produce a moderately good record for the year
as a whole. Even the knowledge of the first quarter alone would make
a substantial contribution to the quality of annual forecasts of GNP.
This is indicated by some experiments we have performed following
•a suggestion by Geoffrey Moore. These show, in effect, that if one
knew what the early parts of the next year would bring and extrap-
olated this information in simple ways, the resulting annual forecasts
would compare very well indeed with the actual forecasts we have
examined.
We proceed by constructing hypothetical "ex.postforecasts"incor-
porating information about parts of the predicted future, which isYardsticks of Predictive Performance 105
regarded as free of errors. The first assumption is that the forecaster
has full knowledge of the level of the series in the fourth quarter of
the base year (ECP) and in the first quarter of the coming year. Three
types of extrapolations are then applied successively. (1) The level of
the series next year is taken simply as equal to the first quarter's level
expressed at the annual rate. This extrapolation, a variant of Nl, will
be called XQ1. (2) It is assumed that the level in the second quarter
will differ from that in the first by the amount of the last "known"
change (which here is that from the fourth quarter of the current year
to the first quarter of the next year); also, that the third quarter will
differ from the second, and the fourth quarter from the third, by the
same amounts. This leads to a variant of the N2 model, to be denoted
as XQ1. (3) Incorporating the assumed knowledge of the current and
coming quarter, the mean historical change in the series is computed
and projected to obtain the predictions of the three remaining quarters
of the next year. This is a variant of the N2* model and it is labeled
XQ1*.
Thesecond assumption about the available degree of foresight is
that, in addition to ECP and the first quarter, the level of the series
in the second quarter of the coming year is also known. Again, the
three types of extrapolations are applied, in analogy to Ni, N2, and
N2*, respectively, which yields the following models. (4) The series is
assumed to remain at its second quarter's level in both the third and
the fourth quarter (XQ2). (5) The series is assumed to change in the
third quarter by the ("known") amount of its change in the second
quarter, and the change in the fourth quarter is also set as equal to
the same amount (XQ2). (6) The average change in the series is
computed from the past record, including in addition the changes in
the first half of the coming year, the knowledge of which is imputed
to the forecaster. The projection of this amount of change over the
second half of the year is used to construct annual predictions XQ2*.2l
21Letthe values of a series in quarter IV of the current year and in quarters I
and II of the predicted year, expressed at annual rates, be A0, A1, and A2. Let the
average historical change incorporating quarters IV and I be A(l) and the cor-
responding measure incorporating quarters IV, I, and II be &(2). Then the six
experiments can be described as follows:
(1) XQ1 A1
4A1+6(A1—A0)5A1—3A0
(2) QL1l 4 2106 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
The results of applying these models of ex-postprojectionsto both
GNP and industrial production are summarized in Table 19. As shown
there, three forecasts covering the years 1953—63 managed to do better
than the simple last-level and last-change extrapolations of the coming
year's first quarter, XQ1 and XQ1 (compare lines 1 and 2 with lines
8—10). For industrial production, the forecasts are even somewhat bet-
ter than the trend extrapolation XQA1*,butfor GNP the reverse is
true (lines 3 and 8—10).
Those extrapolations that use the second quarter as well are gener-
ally superior to the forecasts of GNP. For industrial production, XQ2
and XQ2* also score better than the forecasts, but the differences are
smaller here and at least one forecast comes out ahead of XQ2 (com-
pare lines 4—6 and 8—10).
The trend extrapolations tend to be better than the other models,
as would be expected (one exception is that XQ2 gives the best results
for industrial production). The only case of decidedly poor perform-
ance is XQA5 for GNP (see lines 1—6).
As a next step, it seemed desirable to relax the strong assumption
of perfect knowledge which underlies these models. We replace the
actual values for the early part of the predicted year by reported
quarterly forecasts and again use extrapolations for the rest of the year.
Table 19 shows that such a combination (GXQA2*), which uses fore-
casts for the first two quarters and trend projections for quarters III
and IV, yields on the average somewhat smaller errors than the fore-
casts proper for GNP (compare lines 7 and 8—10). In the case of indus-
trial production, the results are mixed: one forecast is a little worse
and one better than GXQ2*.
Chart 6 presents the year-by-year record of predicted changes and their
44 +6(1)
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CHART6
Four/Typesof Ex-Post Extrapolationsof GNP and Industrial
Produ1ction,Actual and Predicted Changes and Errors, 1953—63
109
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errors for four of our seven experimental models.22 This chart should
be compared with Charts 1 and 2 (for the forecasts proper) and Chart
5 (for the ex-ante extrapolations).2 In this way, one can observe that
some similarities exist between forecasts and the first-quarter extrapo-
lations, and that great improvements are effected by the incorporation
of near-term foresight in the extrapolative models. The most dramatic
improvements, in terms of bias elimination as well as reduction of the
size of errors, come with the inclusion of the second quarter (which
receives a dominant weight in the corresponding models, see the form-
ulas (4)—(6) in footnote 21). The error-increasing and partly biasing
effects of using forecasts instead of actual values for quarters I and II
can be seen by comparing graphs for XQ,2* and GXQa2* in Chart 6.
The mild improvements resulting from the use of simple trend pro-
jections N2* instead of forecasts for quarters HI and IV can only be
detected with difficulty by comparing the graphs for CXQa2* in Chart
6 with those for the forecast set G in Charts 1 and 2.
SECTORAL FORECA5TS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS FOR
DIFFERENT SPANS
Table 20 compares forecasts of GNP components in set C with simple
level and trend extrapolations. The average absolute errors of these
forecasts were presented earlier (see Table 15).
The ranks of the different variables according to the over-all errors
of percentage changes (Me) are relatively independent of the span.
Among the shortest as well as the longer forecasts, total consumption
has the smallest errors, government expenditures and consumer dur-
ables follow, and the investment variables show the largest errors.24
Comparisons with extrapolations yield less consistent results. Accord-
ing to the R1 ratios, which are based on simple level projections, total
22 For the corresponding summary measures, see Table 19, lines 1 and 5—7. The
models not shown in the chart (they are listed on lines 2—4) include extreme cases
such as XQ,, which works relatively well for the production index but poorly for
GNP, and XQ2, for which the reverse is true. The selection was found sufficiently
illustrative for our present purpose.
22 To facilitate such comparisons, all graphs for GNP were drawn on the same
scale, and so were all graphs for the production index.
24 The values of M are larger for residential construction than for plant and
equipment, but they are larger still for total GPIM, which suggests a major weak-
ness of the inventory change forecasts. (The latter and the net foreign investment

















































Forecastsof EightSelected Components of GNP: Comparisons with
Extrapolations over Spans from Three to Eighteen Months, 1958-63
Span of Forecast(months)
Three Six NineTwelveFifteen










0.7720.853 0.796 1.059 0.836

















(continued)Yardsticks of Predictive Performance 113
TABLE 20 (concluded)
Span of Forecast (months)
Three Six NineTwelveFifteen
Line ErrorStatistics5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Change in fnuentories'
19. (billion dollars) 2.54 5.31 5.67 6.78 6.58
20.Ratio R1 0.6920.8810.901 1.2920.903
21.Ratjo'R2* 0.6900.8730.889 1.317 0.899
Net Foreign Balancet'
22. (billion dollars) 1.09 1.35 1.38 1.51 1.73
23.Ratio R1 1.0720.9280.7660.6860.736
24.Ratio 1.0480.8940.7300.659 0.721
5Mdenotes the root mean square error of foreciast;anddenote the
root mean square error ratios of forecast to extrapolation (see the formulae
in Table 18, note 6).
bForecastscover the period 1958-63. The numbers of observations are 21.
20, 19, 13, and 7 for spans of 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 months, respectively. The
numbers vary because some of the forecast chains do not include, all spans
(see Table 9, note b).
CForecasts cover the period 1961-63. The numbers of observations for spans
of 3 to 15 months are 13, 11, 10, 7, and 4.
dForecastscover the period 1958-63. The numbers of observations for spans
of 3 to 15 months are 19, 17, 16, 10, and 5.
consumption again has the best record (lowest ratios), followed by
governmental expenditures; but consumption of durable goods per-
forms no better here than the investment variables. In agreement with
the findings for the annual figures, comparisons with simple trend
extrapolations are very unfavorable to the consumption forecasts. Most
of the R2* ratios exceed one for both total consumer expenditures and
spending on consumer durables, and this includes the short as well114 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
as the longer forecasts (Table 20, lines 3 and 6). In fact, these ratios tend
to be larger for consumption than for any other major GNP com-
ponent.
The R2* ratios are generally high; 35 per cent of them exceed unity
(there is at least one case of R2 *>1.0 for each of the variables); 25 per
cent fall into the range 0.80—0.99; and the remaining 20 per cent are
all above 0.6.
The R1 ratios are as a rule smaller, but they are often sizable. While
no more than one-eighth of them exceed 1.0, only about one-fourth are
less than 0.6.
The margins by which R2* exceed R1 are particularly large for series
with strong trends such as consumption, as would be expected. By the
same token, the two ratios are closely similar for series in which trends
are unimportant, such as net change in inventories and net foreign bal-
ance. Also, the margins in favor of R2* often increase with the span of
forecast—which presumably reflects the fact that trends are more im-
portant over longer periods of time.
Table 20 shows a tendency for the R2* ratios to increase with the
predictive span in most cases, but not always. Where the ratios rise,
they do so irregularly (the only exception is the forecast span of gov-
ernment spending on line 18). For two variables, residential construc-
tion and net foreign balance, the ratios are actually higher for the short
forecasts than for the longer ones (lines 15 and 24).
There is no reason to expect uniformity in the relation between fore-
casts and extrapolations for different spans when comparing results for
variables with very different characteristics. Such comparisons can be
instructive, but additional data are needed at this point and they are
hard to get. The available evidence leaves much to be desired, since
forecasts C cover a short period of time and their number varies for
different spans (see notes to Table 20).
TURNING-POINT ERRORS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS
The use of extrapolative criteria in the appraisal of forecasts has cer-
tain implications for turning-point errors. To reconsider the latter, the
concepts and notation introduced in the last section of Chapter 4 must
be recalled.
A forecast that never predicted any turning points would, of course,
have a zero score on "bits" (TT =0),but also a zero score on falseYardsticks of Predictive Performance 115
signals (NT =O).25 Onthe other hand, by missing all the actual turns,
such a forecast would have the worst possible score on errors of the
second kind: its ET2 ratio=
TN would equal one. Bench- TN+TT
mark forecasts based on extrapolations of the most recent levels or
changes or of trends (Ni, N2, N2*) do not predict turning points and
have, therefore, exactly these characteristics.
The other extreme is represented by a model that predicts a turning
point on each occasion. Such a forecast would miss no turns (TN =0)
but would have the largest possible number of false signals. Here NT
would equal the number of all periods in which there were no observed
turns, and theratio would be correspondingly at the maximum.
The built-in disadvantage of forecasts vis-à-vis extrapolations with
respect to false warnings may or may not be outweighed by the poten-
tial advantage of making correct turning-point predictions. It is diffi-
cult to decide what weights to attach to the two kinds of error without
information on costs of missed turns vs. false signals to the forecast
user.
One simple criterion, implying equal weights, is that the total num-
ber of errors of either kind (n8 =NT+ TN) be less than the total num-
ber of turns recorded (flaTT + TN). The requirement that n, < na
reduces to NT < TT. In simple extrapolations, of course, n5 =71a,be-
cause NT =0and TN =
Howevr,it could be argued that forecasts for which n5 =namay be
better than extrapolations, even if they show no fewer errors of both
kinds, if they correctly predict at least some turning points (since then
TT > 0, whereas for the extrapolations TT is always zero).
For ten of the forecast sets listed in Table 8, the condition n8 < na
is satisfied. In the five remaining cases, n6 =n8.
All measures based on the proportion of errors in the turning-point
forecasts, that is, on some combinations of ET1andET2,areof course
functions of TN, NT, and TT only. They disregard NN, the fre-
- NT
25 Thus all terms in the ratio of false signals, ET1
=NT+ TT'would in this case
equal zero, making the expression indeterminate.
28 In the model which predicts a turn on each occasion, n9 =NTand n5 =TT
(since TN =NN0). The criterion n0 <ne, therefore, simply describes for this
model the requirement that successes be more numerous than failures. The model
will meet this requirement if and only if n0> l/2n, where n is the total number
of forecasts (— n0 +116 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
quency of those periods in which neither the predicted nor the actual
values showed a change in direction. The simplest measure that would
—NT+TN n6 take NN into account is =
__________
= __, wheren8 is the
n n8+n8
number of all directionally correct predictions (=NN+ TT) and n
the number of all predictions covered. The E ratios for the forecasts
in Table 8 range from 0 to 0.24 and average about 0.12 (that is, the
over-all proportion of turning-point error is 12 per cent).
The proportion of turning points observed in the past, ne/n, 5
known to the forecaster but is of little help to him, even if it is ac-
cepted as the best forecast of the proportion that will prevail in the
future. This expected value is a fraction, but the forecaster must de-
cide on each occasion whether or not a directional change is about to
occur: he can either predict one or not but he cannot predict a frac-
tion. Suppose that he adopts the following decision rule: never pre-
dict a turn for a series which shows fla/fl<1/2 and always predict a
turn for a series which shows fla/fl>1/2.This would amount to the
use of the first of our twO extreme benchmark models in the former
case and of the second one in the latter case. But the proportions of
predicted turns would then be 0 and 1, respectively, and they would
probably be poor approximations to the true fraction ne/n in either
case.
Clearly, itis not satisfactory to compare the forecasts with these
limiting alternatives only. An extrapolative benchmark model is
needed, which could produce turning points depending on the con-
figurations of previous increases and decreases in the series concerned.
Autoregressive models which incorporate several lagged terms can in
principle meet this need.
The results of the annual N3 extrapolations for GNP and industrial
production are, however, distinctly unfavorable with respect to pre-
dictions of the direction of change, as shown for the five-lag models
in Chart 3. For GNP, no declines were indicated by the model in
either 1954 or 1958, but a slight decline was predicted for 1960, a
year in which GNP flattened off in another mild recession but did not
fall relative to the preceding year. This record containing two missed
turns and one false signal (in comparison with the early estimates) is
much worse than that of the forecasts proper, which show no moreYardsticks of Predictive Performance 117
than one missed turn in the same period. And for industrial produc-
tion the performance of the model shown in Chart 3 was still weaker.
Here the model predicted negative changes in six of the eleven years
but only once correctly (for 1954). Again, failures of this magnitude
are in general not observable among the forecasts proper.
Evidence' on these and other comparisons between forecasts and
extrapolations is presented in Table 21. Here the over-all percentages
of directional errors (ET)arelisted for several sets of reported forecasts
and constructed benchmark predictions relating to some of the major
expenditure series as well as to total GNP and industrial production.
It turns out that the performance of N3 with several lagged terms is
in most cases inferior to that of other extrapolative models, such as
N2* and N3 with but one or two lags (the reverse is true only for
plant and equipment outlays; compare columns 1—4, lines 11—15). The
addition of lagged terms in the N3 model appears to often have the
effect of causing "extra" turns, which both N2 and N3, with fewer
lags, avoid.
Comparing the results obtained for different variables, we find that
they suggest the following. (1) The frequency of turning-point errors
tends to be considerably larger in extrapolations than in forecasts for
GNP and, particularly, for industrial production. (2) Directional errors
are much more numerous in predictions of gross private domestic in-
vestment, and this applies to both forecasts proper and extrapolations.
There is some evidence here that forecasters, by and large, did a little
better than the adopted benchmark models, but it is certainly not
conclusive. For plant and equipment outlays, for example, some of the
evidence points in the opposite direction (see lines 4, 5, 13, and 14).
(3) Forecasts of consumption show very few turning-point errors,
and most sets show no such errors at all. The trend and autoregres-
sive extrapolations N2* and N3 produced no errors of direction
for this series which, itwill be recalled, was fairly smooth and
growing from year to year in the period concerned (see lines 2 and
12).
Some other measures pertaining to forecasts only provide further
indications that directional errors are particularly frequent for highly
volatile series that show large changes which can vary in sign. This is

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.120 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
net foreign investment (lines 7 and 8). On the other hand, forecasts of
government expenditures, like those of consumption, show very few
or no directional errors (line 9).27
27 Thestatements in this and the preceding paragraph are based on considerably
more evidence than the selection presented in Table 21. In each case both forecasts
and extrapolations were compared with the same set of "actual" data, which, as
elsewhere, consist of the early vintage estimates available on an annual basis in the
first quarter following the year to which the forecasts refer.